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THE PENSION MIS-SELLING SCANDAL, THE SEC,
AND THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD
JOHN A. TURNER*
***

A growing literature has documented the low quality of financial advice
that many people receive because of conflicts of interest that many
financial advisers have. The Council of Economic Advisers has found
that bad advice from financial advisers concerning rollovers from 401(k)
plans to IRAs costs U.S. workers $17 billion a year. When a similar
situation occurred in the United Kingdom, the situation was termed the
“pension mis-selling scandal.” British financial market regulators levied
billions of pounds in fines on financial service providers to compensate
pension participants for the bad advice they had received. This paper
argues that a pension mis-selling scandal is occurring in the United
States. Despite the fiduciary duty of financial advisers, and the task of the
SEC to enforce that fiduciary responsibility, the SEC has taken no action
to protect pension participants relating to advice to roll funds over from
low-fee 401(k) plans to IRAs, which generally charge higher fees. Even
in the case of advice to roll funds over from the extremely low-fee Thrift
Savings Plan for federal government workers (which charges less than 3
basis points), the SEC has taken no action. This paper compares the
pension mis-selling scandal in the United Kingdom to the situation in the
United States concerning pension rollovers to IRAs. The paper then
compares the regulatory response of financial market regulators in the
United Kingdom to that of the SEC. The main findings of this paper are
the apparent view of the SEC that fees in the context of pension rollovers
are not an important issue, and the related finding that there has been a
lack of action by the SEC concerning pension mis-selling in the United
States. These findings are both consistent with the hypothesis of
regulatory capture of the SEC. Because the fiduciary standard of the
SEC is weak, extending it to broker-dealers will have limited effect.
***
I received helpful comments from participants at the Fifth Annual National
Benefits and Social Insurance Conference at the University of Connecticut, from
participants at a seminar of the Savings and Retirement Foundation in Washington,
DC, and from Benjamin Jones.
*
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“The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect
investors. . . .”1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has the job of
protecting U.S. investors in financial markets.2 One way it does that is to
regulate the services provided by Registered Investment Advisers (RIAs).
RIAs have a fiduciary duty to provide advice that is in the best interest of
their clients.3 However, one problem clients encounter is called “hat
switching.”4 With “hat switching,” an adviser sometimes acts as an RIA with
a fiduciary duty, and sometimes acts as a broker-dealer, with a suitability
duty, which is a lower standard. Broker-dealers are regulated by the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). Under the suitability
standard, advice, rather than being in the best interest of the client, must
merely be suitable for the client, given the client’s age, income and assets,
risk preferences, and other factors.5 For this and other reasons, it may be
difficult for clients to determine what standard of regulatory protection, if
any, applies to the advice they are receiving.6 The SEC has been considering
extending its fiduciary standard to broker-dealers.7
RIAs advise some workers relating to their pensions, which for
many people are their primary or only form of financial market investment.
While only 13.8 percent of households directly held stocks in 2013, 49.2
percent of households held retirement accounts, primarily Individual

1

U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, What We Do (2016),
https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
2
Id.
3
Peter Lazaroff, The Difference Between Fiduciary and Suitability Standards,
FORBES (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterlazaroff/2016/04/06/thedifference-between-fiduciary-and-suitability-standards/#4d42e9a735bf.
4
John A. Turner & Dana M. Muir, The Market for Financial Advisors 13-45
(Olivia S. Mitchell & Kent Smetters, eds., 2013).
5
Lazroff, supra note 3.
6
Angela A. Hung et al., Investor and Industry Perspectives on Investment
Advisors and Broker-Dealers, RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST. (2008)
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf.
7
John Manganaro, Optimizing Your Practice to Capture Rollovers, Plan
Adviser (Mar. 28, 2014) http://www.planadviser.com/Optimizing_Your_Practice
_to_Capture_Rollovers.aspx.

2016

PENSION MIS-SELLING SCANDAL

265

Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and 401(k) plans.8 When employees with a
401(k) plan, or with a similar type of defined contribution plan, terminate
employment, they generally have the options of leaving the money in the
retirement fund of the former employer, cashing out the account, transferring
the money to the plan or another employer, or transferring the money to an
Individual Retirement Account (IRA).9
Because many people lack financial sophistication, when they
change jobs or retire they seek the advice of investment advisers about how
to invest the assets in their employer-sponsored retirement
accounts.10 Because of the way the adviser is compensated, the advice that
yields the adviser the most income is not always the best advice for the client.
According to one adviser, “…you come to believe what is in your interest to
believe; your objectivity and professional judgment is always at risk of being
compromised if you put yourself in a conflicted situation where your
interests are not 100% aligned with your client’s.”11
Financial advisers who earn fees based on the amount of assets they
manage may advise rolling over pension assets into an IRA because that will
yield greater income for the adviser. The situation of financially illiterate
clients interacting with advisers who have a conflict of interest generally
creates the potential for an agency problem, in which the agent or adviser
may not act in the best interest of the client.12
Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2010-2013:
Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 100 FED. RES. BULL. 4 (Sept.
2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2014/pdf/scf14.pdf.
9
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN. PRIV. PENSION PLAN BULL.,
ABSTRACT OF 2013 FORM 5500 ANN. REP. (2015), https://www.dol.gov/sites/
default/files/ebsa/researchers/statistics/retirementbulletins/2013pensionplanbulletin.pdf.
10
Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, The Economic Importance of
Financial Literacy: Theory and Evidence, 25 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 1, 5-44 (Mar.
2014), http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.52.1.5; David M.
Abbey & Brian Reid, INV. CO. INST., The Role of IRAs is U.S. Households’ Saving
for Retirement 2014, http://www.ici.org/pdf/15_ici_omb_data.pdf.
11
Christopher Carosa, Exclusive Interview: Clark Blackman II Says SEC
Fiduciary Fix ‘Not Tough Stuff’; Proposed DOL Fiduciary Rule a “Band-Aid”,
FIDUCIARYNEWS (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.fiduciarynews.com/2015/12/
exclusive-interview-clark-blackman-ii-says-sec-fiduciary-fix-not-tough-stuffproposed-dol-fiduciary-rule-a-band-aid/.
12
John A. Turner, Bruce W. Klein, & Norman P. Stein, Financial Illiteracy
Meets Conflicted Advice: The Case of Thrift Savings Plan Rollovers, 3 J.
RETIREMENT 47 (2016).
8
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In advising a client on whether to roll funds over to an IRA, an RIA
has a conflict of interest, even if the adviser charges by the hour, rather than
by assets under management. If the adviser advises the client to stay with the
401(k) plan, the adviser will receive a one-time fee for that advice. But if the
adviser advises the client to roll funds over to an IRA that he or she manages,
the adviser will receive a continuing stream of advisory fees, which can be
as much as two percent of assets under management,13 though more
generally they are around one percent.14 Thus, the adviser’s incentive to
advise a client to roll over his or her 401(k) plan to an IRA can be substantial.
Employees often wrongly assume that they are receiving objective advice,
that they have fiduciary protection concerning the advice they receive, and
that the adviser has their best interests at heart. One survey found that 42
percent of investors thought that broker-dealers have a fiduciary duty to their
clients, which is incorrect.15
This paper raises an issue that when it occurred in the United
Kingdom was called the “pension mis-selling scandal.”16 It presents the case
that pension mis-selling has occurred in the United States as well. The paper
applies the economic theory of agency to analyze the regulation of the market
for financial advice by the SEC. It does so by focusing on pension rollovers
to IRAs. It compares the role of the SEC in protecting pension participants
in the United States when they receive bad advice from financial advisers to
the actions taken by British financial market regulators following the
pensions mis-selling scandal in the United Kingdom.
The paper is structured as follows. First, it discusses the literature
relating to financial advice and regulatory protections. Second, it documents
that pension rollovers play a key role in the U.S. retirement income system,
causing IRAs to have more assets than either 401(k) plans or defined benefit
plans. Third, it presents evidence that these rollovers are often not in the best
interest of workers, in part because of the higher fees attached to IRAs, but
also because of the loss of fiduciary protections. Fourth, it discusses an
extreme example of bad advice, which relates to rollovers from the Thrift
Id.
Intro: Average Financial Advisor Fees in 2016: Full Details on Advisory &
Investment
Management
Fees
(Comparison),
ADVISORYHQ
(2016),
http://www.advisoryhq.com/articles/financial-advisor-fees-wealth-managersplanners-and-fee-only-advisors/#Percentage-AUM.
15
Hung et al. supra note 6, at 10.
16
Sue Ward, Personal Pensions in the UK, the Mis-Selling Scandal and the
Lessons to be Learnt 139-146 (Gerard Hughes & Jim Steward eds., 2000).
13
14
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Savings Plan for federal government workers, a plan that charges extremely
low fees of less than 3 basis points. Fifth, it compares the lack of action by
the SEC with the regulatory response of the U.K. financial markets
regulators. It also presents evidence that the SEC has not considered fees
charged for rollovers to be an important issue, despite a Council of Economic
Advisers study indicating that bad advice about making pension rollovers is
costing U.S. pension participants $17 billion a year. Last, the paper draws
conclusions concerning the protection the SEC provides to U.S. pension
investors.
II.

LITERATURE

Three approaches have been taken in law to deal with conflicts of
interest: (1) prohibition, (2) disclosure, and (3) the fiduciary standard. With
prohibition, conflicts of interest are not allowed. With disclosure, conflicts
of interest are allowed, but the adviser must disclose these conflicts of
interest. With the fiduciary standard, conflicts of interest may be allowed,
but the adviser is prohibited from acting on them.17
The law and economics literature discusses the role of a fiduciary
standard as one way of dealing with the “agency problem”: a problem in
which the agent has a conflict of interest and superior knowledge, and it is
difficult for the client to assess the advice of the agent.18 Because of low
levels of financial literacy among pension participants, financial advisers
(the agents) have superior knowledge over pension plan participants. To deal
with the potential for bad advice, with the fiduciary standard, the agent is
supposed to act solely in the best interest of the client. However, clients have
a lack of financial sophistication and thus are unable to evaluate the quality
of the advice they receive. For this reason, they play a weak role in helping
regulators enforce the financial market regulations that supposedly protect
them.
A fourth approach in public policy for dealing with conflicts of
interest is to provide financial education that leads to financial literacy.
Presumably, financially literate investors will be less susceptible to bad
advice.
People who are not financially literate often are not able to evaluate
the quality of advice they receive. The Australian financial markets regulator
did a study that rated the quality of financial advice that people received. Out
Turner & Muir, supra note 4.
Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV.
1039, 1041-55 (2011).
17
18
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of 64 cases reviewed, it found that only two people received what it
considered to be high-quality financial advice. The majority (37 people)
received adequate advice, while a significant minority (25 people) received
poor quality advice—i.e., advice that was inappropriate for their situation.19
Yet in the Australian study, most people who received poor advice thought
that they had received good advice.20 This phenomenon makes it difficult
for regulators to counteract poor quality advice.
Turner, Klein, and Stein document that some advisers with a
fiduciary duty are advising participants in the Thrift Savings Plan for federal
government workers to roll their funds over to higher-fee IRAs.21 The Thrift
Savings Plan charges the lowest fees of any 401(k)-type plan in the United
States, less than three basis points per year.
This paper documents that the SEC has not taken a role in protecting
American pension participants concerning pension mis-selling, whereas the
British financial regulators have stepped in and done so. The literature
relating to the pension mis-selling scandal in the United Kingdom is
discussed later.
One possible explanation for the inaction of the SEC is “regulatory
capture.” Regulatory capture refers to the regulated industry so influencing
the regulator that the regulator does a poor job in protecting the public.
Woodward and Etzioni discuss the issue of the regulatory capture of the
SEC.22 Gadinis presents evidence as to the weak enforcement of cases by the
SEC against large banks and brokerage firms.23 The article demonstrates a
19
Peter Kell, The Future of Financial Advice Post FOFA (2012),
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/Future-of-advice-postFoFA.pdf/$file/Future-of- advice-post-FoFA.pdf.
20
Id.
21
Turner, Klein & Stein, supra note 12 at 47.
22
SUSAN E. WOODWARD, REGULATORY CAPTURE AT THE U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION in JAMES R. BARTH, R. DAN BRUNBAUGH, JR., & GLENN
YAGO, EDS., RESTRUCTURING REGULATION AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, (The
Milken Institute Series on Financial Innovations and Growth, Kluwer Academic
Publishers 2000), http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=mAHsmzdUbs
IC&oi=fnd&pg=PA99&dq=regulatory+capture+of+the+SEC&ots=lLK2zHvG3&sig=cRYeKtvws3yHw9EdiAWpsiPjkHk#v=onepage&q=regulatory%2
0capture%20of%20the%20SEC&f=false; Amitai Etzioni, The Capture Theory of
Regulations – Revisited, 46 SOC’Y 319 (2009), http://www2.gwu.edu/~ccps/
etzioni/documents/A400%20Society,%20Capture.pdf.
23
Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from
Enforcement Against Broker-Dealers, 67(3) BUSINESS LAWYER 679 (2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1333717.
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systematic lack of action against individual violators in high-profile cases.
As far as we are able to determine, the SEC has never filed a case concerning
advice about pension rollovers, despite those rollovers sometimes involving
large increases in fees.
The International Organisation of Pension Supervisors (IOPS 2015)
argues that pension mis-selling is more likely to occur in countries with
relatively little regulation on competition in financial markets. For the
purposes of our paper, whether or not the inaction by the SEC is due to
regulatory capture is a secondary issue. The main issue is the failure of the
SEC to act to deal with pension mis-selling in the United States.
III.

PENSION MIS-SELLING IN THE UNITED STATES

The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) has quantified the cost of
pension mis-selling in the United States. It finds that conflicted advice costs
participants in IRAs $17 billion a year.24 That amount comprises not only
excess fees but also lower investment returns compared to what investors
would have received in net rates of return had they not been advised to roll
their funds over to an IRA. Thus, pension mis-selling is one reason for the
shortfall of retirement savings in the United States. A large amount of this
loss, and the underlying reason for why it is occurring, relates to the higher
fees earned by the financial services industry.
Supporting the conclusions of the CEA, a recent study in 2015 by
Munnell, Aubrey and Crawford finds that IRAs tend to receive net rates of
return that are about 1 percentage point less than those of employer-provided
defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans.25 This result is largely due
to a difference in fees, but it is also due to differences in asset allocation. A
higher percentage of assets in IRAs is invested in money market funds,
which would seem to be a poor investment choice for retirement savings.
The CEA estimate takes into account increased trading costs and
increased administrative fees compared to a 401(k) plan, but it does not
factor in that a person in an IRA is more likely to pay a financial adviser for

EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, The Effects of
Conflicted Investment Savings (2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/docs/cea_coi_report_final.pdf.
25
Alicia H. Munnell, Jean-Pierre Aubrey & Caroline V. Crawford, Investment
Returns: Defined Benefit vs. Defined Contribution Plans, CTR. FOR RET. RES. AT
B.C.,
Issue
Brief
no.
15-21
(Dec.
2015),
http://crr.bc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/IB_15-21.pdf.
24

270

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 23

ongoing investment management services than a person in a 401(k) plan.
Thus, in that respect, it understates the loss.
The bad advice, as well as being costly in the aggregate, is costly at
the individual level. A person who receives advice from a financial adviser
who has a conflict of interest in advising that person to roll over a 401(k)
account to an IRA at retirement will lose, on average, an estimated 12 percent
of his or her savings when those savings are drawn down over 30 years—not
taking into account fees charged by investment advisers.26
Bad outcomes as a result of bad financial advice generally require a
combination of three factors operating simultaneously. First, the pension
participant has a low level of financial literacy—in particular, not
understanding the importance of the difference in fees between different
financial products. Second, the financial adviser has a conflict of interest in
that the advice that yields him the most income is not the best advice for the
pension participant. Third, the regulatory protections are weak or the
enforcement of regulations is weak.
Even bad advice needs to be supported by some argument. One of
the main arguments financial advisers make for rolling over a 401(k) pension
account to an IRA is that the IRA holder has a much larger range of
investment options.27 However, a substantial literature demonstrates that the
cognitive costs of greater choice can lead to worse savings and retirement
investment choices.28 The evidence presented by Munnell, Aubrey, and
Crawford concerning IRA investments in money market funds supports the
idea that the larger range of options does not necessarily have a positive
effect.29 In addition, Shen and Turner demonstrate that the small number of
EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 24.
Turner, Klein & Stein, supra note 12.
28
See Nava Ashraf, Dean Karlan & Wesley Yin, Tying Odysseus to the Mast:
Evidence from a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines, 121(2) Q.J. OF
ECON. 635 (2016), http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25098802.pdf; Brigitte C.
Madrian & Dennis Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation
and Savings Behavior, 116(4) Q.J. OF ECON. 1149, 1180-1182 (2001),
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.uconn.edu/stable/pdf/2696456.pdf; Fabian Duarte
& Justine Hastings, Fettered Consumers and Sophisticated Firms: Evidence from
Mexico’s Privatized Social Security System, Yale U. Dep’t of Econ. (Oct. 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.nber.org/aging/rrc/papers_files/orrc0904/orrc09-04.pdf; Justine Hastings & Lydia Tejeda-Ashton, Financial Literacy,
Information and Demand Elasticity: Survey and Experimental Evidence from
Mexico (NBER Working Paper No. 14538, 2008), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w14538.pdf. (Choi et al. 2006, 2007)
29
See Munnell, Aubrey & Crawford, supra note 25, at 6.
26
27
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options in the Thrift Savings Plan for federal government workers, the
military, and members of Congress (five basic options) permit a high degree
of portfolio diversification.30 Furthermore, section 404(c) of ERISA requires
that 401(k) plans must provide a sufficient range of choices to pension
participants to allow them to select an adequately diversified portfolio.31
IRAs are the largest type of pension plan in the United States, having
overtaken 401(k) plans. Rollovers are the primary source of funding for
IRAs, as relatively few people contribute to IRAs.32 In a rollover, the person
receives a check from the pension plan of a former employer, then deposits
the check with the IRA. In a transfer, the pension plan sends the check
directly to the IRA. We follow common practice and refer to both as
rollovers.
Because of the importance of the rollover decision, many people
seek financial advice. One survey finds that 61 percent of the people with
rollover IRAs received advice from a financial adviser before making the
rollover.33 This compares to 38 percent of families who reported obtaining
information about investing from bankers, brokers, or other sellers of
financial services, and 31.3 percent of families who reported obtaining
information from lawyers, accountants, or other financial advisers.34 Thus,
rollovers are a financial decision in which advice is particularly prevalent.
The frequency of rollovers is surprising because studies have
documented the tendency for pension participants to exhibit inertia.35 Inertia
Sally Shen & John A. Turner, Analyzing the Quality of Financial Advice: Do
Conflicted Advisers Tell Half Truths? (Pension Pol. Ctr., Working Paper May 2016),
http://www.busman.qmul.ac.uk/newsandevents/EventDocuments/BFWG%20Conf
erence%20Papers%202016/ 177059.pdf.
31
Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, §404(c), 88
Stat. 829 (codified in part at 29 U.S.C. (2015)).
32
David M. Abbey & Brian Reid, INV. CO. INST., The Role of IRAs is U.S.
Households’ Saving for Retirement 2014, http://www.ici.org/pdf/15_ici_omb_
data.pdf.
33
Id.
34
Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2010-2013:
Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL. 100(4) (Sept.
2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2014/pdf/scf14.pdf.
35
John Manganaro, Optimizing Your Practice to Capture Rollovers, Plan
Adviser, (March 28), http://www.planadviser.com/Optimizing_Your_Practice_to_
Capture_Rollovers.aspx; See also James J. Choi et al., Defined Contribution
Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Choices, and the Path of Least Resistance 16, 67113 (2002). But see Leslie A. Muller & John A. Turner, The Persistence of Employee
401(k) Contributions Over a Major Stock Market Cycle: The Limited Power of
Inertia 3, 51- 65 (2013).
30
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would cause participants to leave their 401(k) accounts with their former
employers because that is the “path of least resistance.” The rollover trend is
inconsistent with participant inertia because it requires an action by
participants. Most analysis in behavioral economics concerning retirement
focuses on why people do not do something—they do not annuitize, some
do not participate in 401(k) plans offering an employer match or, if they do
participate, do not contribute sufficiently to receive the maximum matching
contribution. However, the study of why clients make rollovers involves the
opposite tendency—a question of why people are doing something.
Because of concerns that rollovers are being driven by faulty advice,
the Department of Labor (DOL), the SEC, and FINRA have all considered
regulatory action,36 and in 2016 the DOL released major new regulations
concerning financial advice received by pension participants.37 The SEC
indicated that it would make examining rollovers a priority for 2014, and
would focus on investment advisers who encourage people to roll funds over
to investments with higher fees.38 However, two years later, the SEC still has
taken no action.
A.

FEES

From an economics perspective, fees are an important issue in
pension rollovers—not just the fees of the investment products, but also the
advisory fees of fiduciary advisers advising participants to roll over their
funds to accounts the adviser would manage. In 20 years, a fee of 50 basis
points (0.5 percent) reduces a portfolio with a 4 percent annual return by
$10,000 compared to a fee of 25 basis points, while the reduction is $30,000
if the fee is 100 basis points.39
In comparing the fees of IRAs and 401(k) plans, the question is not
whether an IRA can be constructed that provides lower fees than 401(k)
plans. Rather, the question is whether the IRAs that people actually have
See Manganaro, supra note 35.
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Fact Sheet: Department of Labor Finalizes Rule to
Address Conflicts of Interest in Retirement Advice, Saving Middle Class Families
Billions of Dollars Every Year”, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/aboutebsa/our-activities/resource-center/fact-sheets/dol-final-rule-to-address-conflictsof-interest-pdf.
38
Fred Reish et al., FINRA’s Reminder About Rollovers: News to Many, RET.
INCOME TEAM NEWSLETTER, http://files.drinkerbiddle.com/files/ftpupload/
MemosandNewsletters/Retirement-Income-Team-Newsletter_Article-2.pdf.
39
U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, How Fees and Expenses Affect Your
Investment Portfolio, https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ib_fees_expenses.pdf.
36
37
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generally charge lower fees than the 401(k) plans they formerly had. In
aggregate, fees are lower in 401(k) plans than in IRAs. In 2014, fees were 58
basis points for an asset-weighted average of 401(k) plans and 74 basis points
for the asset-weighted average of equity mutual funds held in IRAs.40
Some workers changing jobs or retiring may be able to reduce the
fees they pay by moving from a 401(k) plan to an IRA. Such a worker may
be in a 401(k) plan with no low-fee options. For example, the 401(k) plan
for the nonprofit firm Demos in 2012 did not offer any investment options
with an expense ratio of less than 70 basis points.41 A worker may also face
higher fees if he has several small accounts than if he rolls over those
accounts into a single account, such as an IRA or a subsequent employer’s
401(k) plan. For example, some accounts charge fixed fees for small account
balances.
Thus, a rollover may be good advice in some circumstances, but it
generally is not.42 Most 401(k) participants are in large plans, but a minority
are in small plans. In 2013, 9.8 million participants were in plans with less
than 100 participants, while 54.7 million participants were in plans with 100
or more participants.43 Fees tend to be higher in smaller 401(k) plans than in
larger ones. A study of 401(k) fees has found that, because of economies of
scale, plans with more total assets and with more assets per participant tend
to have lower fees.44 Thus, on the basis of fees, a rollover to an IRA is more
likely to be beneficial if it comes from a 401(k) plan that has a small number
of employees and that has relatively small account balances.
Abbey & Reid, supra note 31.
ROBERT HILTONSMITH, THE RETIREMENT SAVINGS DRAIN: THE HIDDEN &
EXCESSIVE COSTS OF 401(K)S 5 (2012).
42
Nancy Anderson, 7 Reasons Not To Rollover Your Orphan 401(K) To An
IRA, FORBES (2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/financialfinesse/2012/07/10/areyour-401k-investments-worth-their-cost/; See also John A. Turner and Bruce W.
Klein, Retirement Savings Flows and Financial Advice: Should You Roll Over Your
401(k) Plan?, Benefits Quarterly 30: Fourth Quarter (2014), 42-54. The fees in these
two studies are not directly comparable. The fees in the 401(k) plan study are plan
averages, while the mutual fund fees are weighted by assets. Thus, the mutual funds
study is overweighted for large accounts, compared to a participant based statistic,
while the plan statistics are over weighted for small plans, compared to a participant
based statistic.
43
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., EMP. BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., PRIV. PENSION PLAN
BULLETIN, ABSTRACT OF 2013 FORM 550 ANNUAL REPORTS (2015),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/researchers/statistics/retirementbulletins/2013pensionplanbulletin.pdf.
44
INV. CO. INST. AND DELOITTE, DEFINED CONTRIBUTION/ 401(K) FEE STUDY
(2009), http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_09_dc_401k_fee_study.pdf.
40
41
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Fees vary considerably across 401(k) plans. One study found that 10
percent of the 130 plans in the study had an “all-in” fee, which includes
administrative fees, of 0.37 percent of assets or less, while 10 percent had an
“all-in” fee of 1.71 percent or more, with an average of 0.72 percent.45 In an
update of that study, 10 percent of the 525 plans surveyed had an “all-in” fee
of 0.28 percent of assets, while 10 percent had an “all-in” fee of 1.38 percent
of assets.46 These statistics compare to an average fee for equity mutual funds
for retail investors of 0.79 percent (79 basis points) and 0.62 percent (62
basis points) in bond funds.47
Some 401(k) plans offer very low fee options that are not available
to participants in IRAs. In particular, some plans provide options that are
institutionally priced rather than retail priced. Institutional pricing is the
reduced pricing that sponsors of defined benefit plans have, which is
sometimes extended for some investment options to participants in the
401(k) plan of the employer. For example, an institutionally priced equity
index fund that a plan sponsor’s defined benefit plan uses could charge fees
as low as 6 basis points to 401(k) plan participants of that plan sponsor. In
some 401(k) plans, the plan sponsor pays the administrative fees, whereas in
an IRA those fees are the individual’s responsibility. According to the
consulting firm AonHewitt, “[w]ithin the defined contribution system, plan
participants not only generally have access to high-quality investment
options at reasonable prices (through lower-cost institutional fund products
such as collective trusts and separate account vehicles), but also benefit from
fiduciary protections. Workers cannot obtain these benefits individually in
the retail market.”48 The “retail market” refers to the IRA market and the
market for private savings. Institutional shares account for 43 percent of the
equity mutual funds held in 401(k) plans.49
The financial incentives for financial firms to advise their clients to
make rollovers are substantial. Even firms that manage clients’ 401(k)
investments often advise their clients to roll those funds over to an IRA when
Id. at 6.
DELOITTE CONSULTING, INSIDE THE STRUCTURE OF THE DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION/401(K) PLAN FEES: A STUDY ASSESSING THE MECHANICS OF THE
“ALL-IN” FEE (2011), http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_11_dc_401k_fee_study.pdf.
47
INV. CO. INST., TRENDS IN THE EXPENSES AND FEES OF MUTUAL FUNDS,
2011 (2012), http://www.ici.org/pdf/per18-02.pdf.
48
AON HEWITT, LEAKAGE OF PARTICIPANTS’ DC ASSETS: HOW LOANS,
WITHDRAWALS, AND CASHOUTS ARE ERODING RETIREMENT INCOME (2011),
http://www.aon.com/attachments/thoughtleadership/survey_asset_leakage.pdf.
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they retire or leave their employers because the firms can make more money
managing IRAs. Not only do financial advisers encourage rollovers, but so
do record keepers for 401(k) plans that also provide mutual funds. These
record keepers advise participants who no longer work for the employer
sponsoring the plan to roll their funds over to an IRA, which the record
keepers would then manage.50
The fees for IRA participants may also include fees for financial
advice because many people are not financially sophisticated and feel as if
they need assistance in managing their accounts, especially when faced with
the large number of options available to IRA participants. One large provider
of financial advice charges fees of 1.5 percent for advisory services for
account balances up to $500,000 on top of the investment fees the mutual
funds in the account charge.51
As an example of bad advice, National Public Radio (“NPR”)
documented the case of a woman who was advised to roll over her 401(k)
plan to an IRA. The adviser told her that the rollover would not result in her
paying any extra fees. When NPR analyzed her financial documents relating
to the rollover, it found that the adviser had invested her money into mutual
funds that charge load fees of 5.75 percent, causing her to lose nearly 6
percent of her retirement savings.52
IV.

THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN (TSP) ROLLOVERS TO IRAS

Financial advisers are advising clients to roll funds over from good,
low-fee defined contribution plans to higher-fee IRAs. The case of the Thrift
Savings Plan is a particularly dramatic example. The TSP is a 401(k)-type
defined contribution plan for federal government workers, the military, and
members of Congress. The TSP is the largest pension fund, in terms of assets,

John A. Turner & Kathy K. Perry, Protecting Pension Participates:
Communications Concerning Pension Rollovers From Record Keepers (2016).
51
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-30, 401(K) PLANS LABOR AND
IRS COULD IMPROVE THE ROLLOVER PROCESS FOR PARTICIPANTS 36 (2013).
52
Chris Arnold, When Fees Attack: Rolling Over A 401(k) Can Trigger BigTime Charges, KUNC (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.kunc.org/post/when-feesattack-rolling-over-401k-can-trigger-big-time-charges#stream/0 (Noting a “load”
fee is a sales charge or commission charged to an investor for buying or redeeming
shares in a mutual fund. The fee may be a one-time charge or an annual charge).
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in the United States.53 Its assets are more than 10 times as large as the largest
private-sector defined contribution plan, which is sponsored by IBM.54
The TSP charges extremely low fees—the lowest fees of any plan in
the United States. In 2015, the fees for all the TSP funds, including the
international stock fund and the target date funds, were 2.9 basis points or
less.55 The fees in 2013 were less than one-twentieth the average cost of a
stock index fund and less than one-thirtieth the average cost of target date
funds.56 In 2014, the TSP fees compared to 83 basis points as the participantweighted average for a survey of 401(k) plans, 58 basis points for the assetweighted average of 401(k) plans, and 74 basis points for the asset-weighted
average of equity mutual funds held in IRAs.57 A survey by Morningstar, an
investment research firm based in Chicago, finds that the asset-weighted
average of all mutual funds, excluding money market funds and funds of
funds (FOFs), such as target date funds, was 64 basis points in 2014.58 For
passively managed funds it was 20 basis points, and for actively managed
funds it was 79 basis points.59 That study finds that over time, investors on
average have moved to lower-fee funds, which is the reverse of what happens
when TSP participants roll over their accounts to an IRA.60 The TSP’s fees
are low primarily because of its large size, but in part because some
administrative costs are borne directly by the federal government, and in part
because, as an employer-sponsored plan, it does not engage in advertising.61
The world’s 300 largest pension funds – year end 2013, WILLIS TOWERS
WATSON (September 2014), http://www.towerswatson.com/en/Insights/ICTypes/Survey-Research-Results/2014/09/The-worlds-300-largest-pension-fundsyear-end-2013.
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The Economics of Providing 401(k) Plans: Services, Fees, and Expenses, 21
ICI RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE 1 (2015).
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Fund Comparison Matrix, THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN (2016),
https://www.tsp.gov/InvestmentFunds/FundsOverview/comparisonMatrix.html.
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Vanguard Target Retirement Funds, VANGUARD (2014), https://investor.
vanguard.com/mutual-funds/target-retirement/#/.
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Despite the TSP’s extremely low fees, some participants are being
advised to roll their TSP funds over to managed investment accounts in
IRAs, sometimes resulting in as much as a seventy-fold increase in fees
(from 3 basis points to 230 basis points). A survey of TSP participants who
made a withdrawal in 2013 found that an estimated 16,400 participants
(about one-third of those making withdrawals) withdrew all or part of their
TSP account because they were advised by their financial adviser to do so.62
A telephone survey study that asked financial advisers for advice concerning
TSP rollovers found that advisers generally advised the callers to make a
rollover, despite the very low fees in the TSP. That advice on average cost
participants approximately $20,000 in present value of increased fees.63
V.

UNITED KINGDOM—THE PENSION MIS-SELLING
SCANDAL64

The United Kingdom also has had experience with people being
advised to roll over from good, employer-provided pension plans to higherfee individual account pension plans. That episode is known in the U.K. as
the “pension mis-selling scandal.”65 The “pension mis-selling scandal” is the
term used in the United Kingdom to refer to the situation in which many
people were advised to switch their pension plans from employer-provided
defined benefit pension plans to individual account pensions in instances
where those changes were in the financial interest of the adviser, but with
little effort made to determine whether the advice was suitable for the client.
In 1988, a regulatory change expanded eligibility for personal
pensions from just the self-employed to all employees. This change
presented financial service providers with an opportunity. As part of a
deregulation of financial products, individuals were permitted to choose
personal pensions instead of participating in the earnings-related part of
social security (SERPS—the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme) or in
employer-provided plans that had been used for “contracting out” of that part
of social security.

AON HEWITT, supra note 48.
Turner, Klein & Stein, supra note 12.
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Firms responded by rewarding new, untrained sales forces with sales
incentives to capture market share. These incentives were awarded for
making direct sales of financial products to consumers who were unfamiliar
with those financial products. Insurance salesmen targeted groups like nurses
and steelworkers who were in good defined benefit plans but who were
nonetheless encouraged to roll those plan funds over to personal pensions
that provided lower benefits.66 These factors created an environment in
which aggressive sales practices thrived.67
The mis-selling of personal pensions from 1988 to 1994 resulted in
the regulatory review of sales of pension products to almost 2 million
customers and in extensive regulatory change. During that six-year period,
people had been encouraged by financial services companies and advisers,
and through a large advertising campaign by financial services companies,
to switch their pension arrangements from employer-sponsored defined
benefit plans to individual account plans, only to end up receiving lower
benefits as a result.68
Due to reports of advisers not complying with regulatory standards
in the sale of personal pensions, in 1992 the government regulator, the
Securities and Investments Board (SIB), reviewed a sample of the records
associated with personal pension sales and found that only 9 percent
substantially complied with regulatory rules.69 The SIB later became part of
a new agency called the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which has since
been replaced by the Financial Conduct Authority. The SIB commissioned a
study of industry practices that found “widespread regulatory compliance
failure”.70
The British media were highly critical of the insurance companies
involved in the mis-selling scandal. The BBC reported that Prudential
(U.K.), which it cited as one of the worst offenders in the mis-selling scandal,
had set aside £1.1 billion to pay for claims related to the scandal. This
implicit admission of guilt followed an earlier statement by the company’s
CEO in 1994 expressing “total reassurance” that Prudential was not guilty of
Id.
Richard Nobles & Julia Black, The Privatization Process: Pensions Misselling – The Lessons for Regulating Privatised Social Security, 64 BROOK. L. REV.
933 (1998); TREASURY SELECT COMMITTEE, NINTH REPORT, 1997-98, H.C. 712-I
(UK).
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Pension Mis-selling, PENSIONS ADVISORY SERV. (2009), http://tools.pensions
advisoryservice.org.uk/common-areas-of-concern/pension-mis-selling.
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pension mis-selling. In 2002, the BBC reported that more than one million
customers would receive compensation for being victims of pension misselling and the total cost would be at least £11.8 billion, with the financial
market regulator taking disciplinary action against 346 firms.71
The concern with mis-selling focused on the sale of personal
pensions, by both insurance companies and independent financial advisers,
to employees who then opted out of an employer-provided pension plan.
Two factors caused employer-provided pension plans to be better
arrangements than personal pensions for most individuals. First, employers
typically contributed to plans they sponsored but did not contribute to
personal pensions. Second, the benefits formula of an employer-provided
plan typically was more generous than the investment growth in a personal
pension.72
Nobles and Black attribute pensions mis-selling in the U.K. to
failures both by regulators and by the firms involved in mis-selling.73 They
argue that until the 1992 SIB audit, regulators failed to focus their efforts on
personal pensions as a product line. Instead the regulators suffered from a
lack of expertise with personal pensions, which represented a new line of
financial products.74 The regulators established review processes that tended
to focus at the firm level and on the activities of the internal firm monitors.
In a government inquiry into the cause of mis-selling, the FSA indicated that
the multiple regulators experienced coordination problems in determining
the responsibilities of the different regulators.75
In 2006, the FSA took further action to deal with investment product
mis-selling, with those new rules coming fully into force in 2012. Despite
the existence of a best-interest or fiduciary standard—meaning the adviser
must act in the best interest of the client—continued problems with
investment mis-selling were observed, leading to the implementation of the
new rules. Previously, financial advisers receiving commissions for making
recommendations concerning pensions to clients had an obligation to make
recommendations in the best interest of the client, but it had become clear
that, because of commissions that caused a conflict of interest for the
advisers, this approach was not working. These regulatory changes improved
the transparency of fees and eliminated the practice of mutual funds and
Pensions Scandal Costs £11.8 Billion, BBC (June 27, 2002),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2070271.stm.
72
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other financial intermediaries paying commissions to advisers that
recommend their products.76
These rules in the United Kingdom thus differ from the approach
taken in the U.S. Department of Labor regulations of 2016, discussed later,
which do not prohibit advisers from receiving commissions, so long as they
act in the best interest of their clients.77 The United Kingdom previously had
taken the approach used by the U.S. Department of Labor but found that the
incentives embedded in that approach were sufficiently strong—and
presumably the enforcement sufficiently weak—to cause that approach to
not provide adequate protection for pension participants.
The new U.K. rules require advisers to receive their income solely
by charging their clients fees for their services. This approach reduces
conflicts of interest that advisers have with respect to the choice of financial
products to sell. It has the further advantage of making the compensation
advisers receive more transparent. This reform was enacted because the
receipt of commissions has been viewed as a root cause of the pension misselling scandal in the United Kingdom.
The U.K. pension mis-selling scandal was much more visible to
participants and plan sponsors than the scandal in the United States, where,
despite the CEA’s report, so far is largely invisible. In the United Kingdom,
the scandal involved a switch from defined benefit plans with clearly
determinable benefits to defined contribution plans that were required to
provide benefits as annuities. Initial concern about the situation was
expressed by plan sponsors, with that concern leading to a study by the
financial regulator, which ultimately documented mis-selling.78
The SIB, the U.K. financial markets regulator at the time, issued
guidance to participants, stating that “it is nearly always best for you” to stay
with your employer’s plan rather than rolling those funds over into an
individual account plan.79 While such advice would probably also apply in
the United States, the U.S. regulators have not given that advice.
76
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The situation in the United States involves a switch from defined
contribution plans to IRAs, in which the comparison with the former plan’s
benefits is difficult for participants to make because it is not as clear what
they would have received had they stayed in the former plan. Perhaps as a
consequence, there appear to be no complaints by people about bad advice
they have received encouraging a rollover to an IRA. If participants were
aware of the importance of fees in determining financial outcomes, the
comparison would not be so difficult, but with the low level of financial
literacy of many people, many participants do not understand the importance
of fees.
A lesson from the experience of the United Kingdom is that the
financial service industry may take advantage of unsophisticated pension
participants in selling them expensive pensions when more suitable, lowerfee pensions are available to them. Pension participants need regulatory
protection.
VI.

THE SEC

This section considers the regulatory oversight provided by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) related to fees charged in
connection to pension rollovers, reasons why that oversight appears to be
weak, and the views of the SEC concerning the level of fees charged by
advisers as a fiduciary or regulatory issue.
A.

THE SEC AND THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD

As a result of the conflict of interest of financial advisers,
government has stepped in through the SEC to regulate financial advice in
order to protect the interests of investors. This regulation involves imposing
a fiduciary standard, which requires that the advice be the best advice for the
client.80 However, over time broker-dealers have increasingly provided
advice, but the SEC has not required that they register as RIAs.81
Unless otherwise indicated, we are referring to the SEC fiduciary standard.
Different organizations have different fiduciary standards, as discussed later in the
paper. The SEC standards are not as stringent as standards found in ERISA and the
IRC. In particular, the SEC generally permits self-dealing transactions that would
largely be prohibited under ERISA and the IRC, as long as the Registered Investment
Adviser (RIA) fully discloses the conflict to the client.
81
Michael Kitces, Is the SEC Failing to Enforce the ‘Solely Incidental’ Advice
Exemption for Broker-Dealers Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940?, NERD’S
EYE VIEW AT KITCES.COM (Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.kitces.com/blog/is-the-sec80
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In 2008, the SEC first considered updating its fiduciary standard.
Christopher Cox, chairman of the SEC at the time, has stated that updating
the standard “is harder than perhaps it ought to be.” He noted, “There are
enormous interests at stake here.” The 2016 chairwoman of the SEC, Mary
Shapiro, has stated that the SEC has had “hundreds of meetings” and that a
task force is working on a proposed rule, but that its efforts only resulted in
a study.82
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010 requires the SEC to undertake a study of the adequacy of consumer
protections regarding financial advice. The study is to assess whether there
should be a uniform standard of conduct for broker-dealers and RIAs. In
2011, the SEC staff released that report, Study on Investment Advisers and
Broker-Dealers.83 The report recommended extending the fiduciary standard
that applies to investment advisers to include broker-dealers. However, the
SEC has not acted on those recommendations, even though more than five
years have passed since the report was released. In March 2015, the SEC
indicated that it would move toward a uniform standard for broker-dealers
and RIAs, but it has provided no indication of the time frame in which it
would do that.84
The Consumer Federation of America has noted that despite years
of entreaties from consumer advocates, the SEC has done nothing to protect
investors in this area. It has failed to propose, let alone finalize, new rules.85
While rule-making in this area is not required by the Dodd-Frank Act, rulefailing-to-enforce-the-solely-incidental-advice-exemption-for-broker-dealersunder-the-investment-advisers-act-of-1940/.
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making in other areas is required, and as of December 31, 2015, the SEC had
failed to meet Dodd-Frank deadlines on 22 percent of its required rules.86
The SEC has been criticized in other contexts for its deference to the
industry it regulates. For example, it has been criticized for its handling of
the bankruptcies of Enron in 2001 and of Lehman Brothers in 2008, and for
its handling of the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme (which cost investors $50
billion) in 2009.87
The SEC regulates RIAs, holding them to a fiduciary standard. The
literature on the regulation of RIAs often focuses on the problem called “hat
switching,” where an adviser will sometimes act as a broker-dealer, with a
suitability standard, and sometimes act as a RIA, with a fiduciary standard
for conduct.88 While the “hat switching” problem is a serious problem, it is
not the main problem with respect to advice concerning pension rollovers.
The main problem is the lack of action by the SEC.
B.

THE SEC, THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD, AND FEES

The SEC appears to consider fees charged by advisers to not be an
important issue in the context of pension rollovers. On its website, the SEC
provides information as to the options a person has when changing jobs. It
provides information on the option of rollovers from a 401(k) plan to an IRA,
but it does not mention that the person should consider the level of fees in
the new plan versus the old plan.
It also fails to mention that the person generally has the option of
leaving the money in the 401(k) plan of his or her former employer, thus
biasing the person’s decision toward the other options, including a rollover
to an IRA. It further biases the decision by noting that for the rollover to an
IRA, but not for other options, your money “can continue to grow over time,
giving you more income to live on in retirement.”
We sought to obtain further information from the SEC concerning
its views on the importance of fees in the rollover decision. To assess the
SEC’s views on the fiduciary standard and the importance of fees, we asked
the SEC through its online contact portal the following question: “If a
DAVIS POLK REGULATORY, DODD-FRANK PROGRESS REPORT: FOURTH
QUARTER (2015), http://prod.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/Q4_2015_DoddFrank_Progress_Report.pdf.
87
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Registered Investment Adviser advises a client to roll over his or her 401(k)
account to an IRA that the adviser would manage, are the management fees
charged by the adviser taken into account when analyzing whether this
advice meets the fiduciary standard?” The SEC declined to provide an
answer to the question, replying that it does not answer hypothetical
questions.
We then presented an actual situation where someone was advised
to roll funds over from the TSP by an adviser that charges a management fee
of 200 basis points, which raised the fees paid by that individual by more
than 70 times. The SEC again declined to provide an answer, saying that it
does not comment on specific cases and that we should consult with an
attorney. In addition, we filed a complaint with the SEC concerning that
particular case, but the SEC never responded to the complaint.
It appears that the SEC does not take into account the fees charged
by advisers when considering whether the advice of the adviser meets the
fiduciary standard, as long as the adviser has clearly disclosed the fees. That
approach considerably weakens the protection provided by the fiduciary
standard. An adviser can thus provide advice that is clearly not in the best
interest of the client if fees are taken into account, so long as the adviser
discloses the fees.
Thus, merely by disclosing the fees, an adviser can satisfy the
fiduciary requirement of acting in the best interest of the client. To give a
specific example, an adviser can advise rolling over assets from the TSP,
which charges fees of less than 3 basis points, to a plan managed by the
adviser that charges 200 basis points for the management fee, and that advice
can meet the standard of being in the best interest of the client if the adviser
discloses the fees.
The SEC thus places considerable reliance on the disclosures of
financial advisers. Surveys of investors, however, indicate that most
investors find the disclosures of financial advisers to be difficult to
understand. Investors also feel that financial advisers do not spend sufficient
time helping them understand the disclosures.89
The SEC has taken a weak position on other issues relating to fees.
For example, in 2012, as required by the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC released
new rules to protect investors concerning income and asset thresholds at
which advisers could charge performance-based fees.90 However, it greatly
Hung, supra note 6.
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weakened the effect of those rules by grandfathering in all persons affected
by the old rules.
The SEC has announced that it intends to propose a new fiduciary
rule that would extend its current fiduciary rule to broker-dealers, perhaps as
early as April 2017.91 While this would be a step in the right direction, its
fiduciary standard is so weak that it would not provide much protection for
pension participants or other investors.
C.

EXPLANATIONS FOR WEAK OVERSIGHT

The SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations has
enforcement authority. However, because of a decrease in the number of
staff in that office owing to a reduction in congressionally approved funding,
the number of examinations has declined, presumably resulting in a
weakening of enforcement by the SEC.92 Furthermore, the Consumer
Federation of America points out that even when a fiduciary duty applies,
the SEC has shown little inclination to enforce it.93
Because of the large amount of money at stake for financial advisers,
they have attempted to influence the regulators. Such influence is sometimes
referred to when it is successful as “regulatory capture” or “regulatory
influence.” One way the SEC may be influenced is through the “revolving
door” of government. Former SEC employees must file post-government
employment statements if they plan to represent a client before the
Commission within two years of leaving the SEC. The Project on
Government Oversight (POGO) filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request for all post-employment statements filed by former SEC employees
between 2006 and 2010. It found that between 2006 and 2010, 219 former
SEC employees filed 789 post-employment statements indicating their intent
to represent an outside client before the Commission.94 The Dodd-Frank Act
raised salaries at the SEC, and at other federal financial regulatory agencies,
compared to those at other agencies in the federal government, in order to
attract and retain qualified staff at the financial regulatory agencies. For
Mark Schoeff Jr., SEC plans to propose fiduciary rule next April, PENSIONS
& INVS., (May 19, 2016), http://www.pionline.com/article/20160519/ONLINE/
160519849/sec-plans-to-propose-fiduciary-rule-next-april?utm_campaign=saxo_
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example, staff at the SEC in 2016 could earn up to $237,700, depending on
where they were working.95 The previously mentioned study refers to the
period before that change, but the effect of that change is not known at this
time.
The SEC is a stand-alone regulatory entity, whereas the Employee
Benefits Security Administration, which has responsibility for protecting
pension participants, is part of a larger agency, the DOL. This difference in
administrative structure may be part of the explanation for why the SEC is
weaker than the Employee Benefits Security Administration with respect to
independence from industry influence.96
D.

THE FEC AND THE SEC

The Federal Elections Commission (FEC) may account for part of
the explanation for the weak oversight provided by the SEC: it may be due
to the election campaign contributions of the financial services industry to
members of Congress, who then favor weak oversight by the SEC. Over the
2013–2014 election cycle, the financial services industry spent $1.4 billion.
More than 340 financial service companies and trade associations each spent
more than $500,000 during this period. Of the total spending, $497 million
was spent on contributions to federal candidates and $908 million was spent
on lobbying. The contributions to federal candidates were split unevenly
between the two parties, with 63 percent going to Republicans and 37 percent
going to Democrats. The financial sector’s campaign contributions were
more than twice that of any other business sector.97 Thus, regulatory capture
can occur both at the agency level and at the level of Congress through
financing congressional election campaigns.
E.

THE SEC AND COMPLAINTS

95
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Pay Structure (2016),
https://www.sec.gov/jobs/sec-pay.shtml.
96
John A. Turner, Gerard Hughes & Michelle Maher, An International
Assessment of Regulatory Capture and Regulatory Outcomes: The Case of Pension
Regulators in Ireland and the United States, J. OF FIN. REG. AND COMPLIANCE
(forthcoming 2017).
97
AMERICANS FOR FINANCIAL REFORM, Updated AFR Report: Financial Sector
Lobbying and Campaign Spending Top $1.4 Billion for 2014 Election Cycle – $1.9 million a day
(March 18, 2015), http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2015/03/afr-report-financial-sector-lobbyingand-campaign-spending-top-1-2-billion-for-2014-election-cycle-1-8-million-a-day/.
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A person receiving bad advice from a financial adviser concerning a
rollover could file a complaint with the SEC. The SEC website, however, is
not “user-friendly” to pension participants filing a complaint. The link on the
SEC website to “Enforcement” would be the most obvious path to follow.
But instead, a person must file a complaint under the link to “Education”—
that’s if they persist sufficiently in searching through the links on the website
to find that link; “Education” would seem to be one of the least likely places
to file a complaint. Even after the person has found the right page, it is not
set up for easily dealing with complaints concerning advice on pension
rollover.
VII.

TWO ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES

This section briefly considers two alternatives to the hypothesis of
regulatory capture as explanations for the weak oversight provided by the
SEC. First, the SEC may not consider the issue of pension rollovers to be in
its bailiwick, but rather, it may hold that issue to be the responsibility of the
DOL. But contrary to that view, some members of Congress have argued
that the SEC, not the DOL, should have jurisdiction in this issue.98 In
addition, opponents of the DOL fiduciary regulations have argued that point
in court.99 Second, the SEC may feel that if it were to bring cases in this area,
it would not prevail in court. Presumably, if the SEC had that opinion it
would favor stronger regulations, but it has not taken that position.
VIII.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR REGULATIONS

In the absence of action by the SEC, the DOL in 2016 promulgated
a fiduciary rule that provides some protection for private-sector pension
participants.100 The rule explicitly provides fiduciary protection to pension
participants for advice from a financial adviser to roll funds over to an IRA.
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The rule arguably would protect all pension participants, including
government employees, when they are advised concerning a rollover to an
IRA. Before the DOL promulgated this regulation, Republicans in Congress
sought to block it by introducing a bill, the Retail Investor Protection Act,
that would prohibit the DOL from finalizing its rule until 30 days after the
SEC had finalized a rule.101 The Republicans presumably made this move
because they recognized the low probability that the SEC would act.
Despite its inaction, at least one of the SEC’s five commissioners
has criticized the attempt of the DOL to deal with pension mis-selling.102
According to a report released by Republicans in the House of
Representatives, the SEC opposes the DOL proposed regulation. The DOL
has denied the substance of that report, while the SEC has refused to
comment on it.103
The DOL has been criticized for regulating in an area outside of its
expertise, and a lawsuit has been filed against the department arguing that
rulemaking in this area should be done by the SEC.104
The regulations do not protect pension participants from generalized
bad advice, such as advertisements that encourage participants to roll over
your old 401(k) plan because “the future you envision for yourself matters

Preserving Retirement Security and Investment Choices for all Americans,
Joint Hearing of the Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises
Subcommittee and the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee and the Financial
Services Committee, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Sept. 10, 2015) (Written
testimony of Barbara Roper delivered to the Joint Hearing of Capital Markets and
Government Sponsored Enterprises Subcommittee and the Oversight and
Investigations Subcommittee), http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/9-10-15%20
CFA%20HFSC%20Hearing%20on%20DOL%20COI%20Rule%20and%20HR109
0_Testimony.pdf; John J. Topoleski & Gary Shorter, Department of Labor’s 2015
Proposed Fiduciary Rule: Background and Issues, CONG. RES. SERV. (2015),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44207.pdf.
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to us.”105 That advice generally results in pension participants paying higher
fees and having fewer regulatory protections.106
IX.

CONCLUSION

The SEC has not taken any action concerning financial advice to roll
over from low-fee 401(k) plans to higher fee IRAs. The lack of action by the
SEC stands in stark contrast to the situation in the United Kingdom, where
the type of advice people received to roll funds over to substantially higherfee pensions is considered to be a scandal and was addressed more than a
decade ago by the U.K. financial market regulators.
The SEC appears to not consider the fees charged by financial
advisers to be an important issue. It does not include fees as an issue in its
advice to people considering rollovers from 401(k) plans to IRAs. It has, to
our knowledge, never brought a case against a financial adviser concerning
fees relating to pension rollovers, even in the extreme case of rollovers from
the TSP, which charges less than 3 basis points. The CEA has concluded that
bad advice concerning pension rollovers is costing U.S. pension participants
$17 billion, but the SEC thus far has not considered this to be an issue that
would warrant action on its part. The CEA study indicates that pension misselling, in which financial advisers have advised pension participants to
switch from relatively low-fee 401(k) plans to higher-fee IRAs, has occurred
on a widespread basis in the United States.
With more responsibility placed on individuals to invest their
retirement assets when they leave an employer’s 401(k) plan, workers often
rely on investment advisers but are often not well-served by them. In this
paper, we compare the regulatory protections pension investors receive in
the United Kingdom to those that have been provided by the SEC relating to
advice concerning pension rollovers. Although the SEC holds RIAs to a
fiduciary standard, and the literature on advice has expressed concern about
the weakening of that protection because of the so-called “hat switching”
problem, the more serious problem is that the SEC does not apply the
fiduciary standard to advice provided by RIAs concerning pension rollovers.
While the DOL has promulgated regulations in this area, those regulations
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in 2016 are being challenged in court, in part on the basis that this area should
be the responsibility of the SEC.
While we have addressed one aspect of the issue of bad advice
concerning pension rollovers, other issues also warrant addressing. For
example, the advice contained in the mutual fund industry advertising
campaign to “roll over your old 401(k)” is bad advice for many participants
and does not come with disclaimers. That advice campaign is treated by the
regulators as sales and marketing, rather than advice. Because most
participants have encountered this advice many times, and presumably many
roll their funds over based on that advice, the protections that this paper
indicates are needed may still be weak in that there are no regulations on this
type of generalized advice—generally bad advice that comes without
disclaimers.

